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That Guy's a Batterer!: A Scarlet Letter
Approach to Domestic Violence in the
Information Age
ELAINE M. CHIU*
I. Introduction
We have all seen the ads and heard the jingles. Some of us may have
even visited the websites. "Come meet your soul mate, come meet your
future spouse, come find true love, at Match.com, at eHarmony.com, at
Yahoo." Internet dating is a booming business. In 2005, an estimated six-
teen million Americans spent more than $245 million looking for love on
the Internet.' Approximately ten-million Americans are current online
daters.2 In addition to these digital matchmakers, social networking sites
like Facebook and MySpace and You Tube offer amazing online commu-
nities where folks can advertise their best features. Then, there is Google.
Many on the dating circuit use that powerful search engine to find infor-
mation about a person of interest and swear by Google as an essential
resource.' Finally, there is an expanding dating-security industry where
background check firms will verify age, identity, address, marital status,
and criminal history.' Some dating sites and social networks have even
* Professor of Law at St. John's University School of Law. I want to thank several law
students who provided invaluable research assistance: Joseph Licare, Natalia Manfredi, Diana
Neyman, Michael Schordine, Ji Shu (Jerry) Zhang and Andrei Pascariu. Finally, I am grateful
for the financial and nonfinancial support of the late Dean Mary Daly, Dean Michael Simons,
and Associate Dean Paul Kirgis.
1. See Bonnie Miller Rubin, Internet Daters, Legislators Want a Little Truth in
Advertising, CHICAGO TRIB., July 28, 2006.
2. See Sara Kehaulani Goo, Dinner, Movie-and a Background Check-for Online
Daters, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 2007.
3. See Dave Orrick, DIY Rap Sheet Checks Get Easier: Background on Criminals, Cads,
All Manner of People Is Just Keystrokes Away, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Aug. 6, 2007.
4. See Goo, supra note 2.
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begun incorporating background checks into their business models.'
Information is the currency of our time. This fact is true in many aspects
of our lives today. It comes as no surprise that it is true in our decisions
about love and intimacy, too.
Despite the remarkable reliance on the Internet as a source of informa-
tion, we have yet to fully take advantage of it in our movement against
domestic violence. The movement has been around for a long time now,
and it has had an enormous impact on the ways we view domestic vio-
lence. Nevertheless, domestic violence continues to occur at worrisome
levels and to be a serious problem for our communities. As a result, the
movement against domestic violence has reached a stage where its mem-
bers are hotly debating the success of the changes they have implement-
ed. There is significant disagreement and conflict over whether reforms
over the past thirty-five years are working or whether the movement needs
to find new approaches.6
Thus far, information is used as a weapon in the battle against domes-
tic violence in several limited ways. For example, many studies are done
on the experiences of domestic violence victims; about the characteristics,
backgrounds, and psychiatric profiles of batterers; and on the patterns of
violence. Federal and state governments gather lots of statistics on the
incidence of domestic violence as reported to or observed by various state
actors. They also collect data on the types of interventions states use to
respond to domestic violence. Information also appears in awareness cam-
paigns and public service announcements in schools, libraries, hospitals,
on billboards, in print media, in television, and on the radio. These pub-
licity efforts educate the public about how to recognize the signs of
domestic violence and about the public resources available to help those
who are being battered and those who want to stop battering. Lastly, state
actors share information about the troubled families experiencing vio-
lence in their communities. Their collaboration leads to coordinated mon-
itoring and assistance for these violent families in trouble.
Yet there is still more we can do with information and, specifically, the
Internet in combating domestic violence. The Scarlet Letter proposal
5. MySpace recently agreed to set up checks against sex offender registries while dating
site True.com conducts criminal and marital checks on its members. This practice "keeps 2% of
applicants from joining because they are convicted felons. . . . [and t]hree % flunk because they
are married." See id.
6. An entire issue of St. John's Journal of Legal Commentary was dedicated to a sympo-
sium on this topic, "Thinking Outside the Box: New Challenges and Directions in Domestic
Violence." It was held in March 2009 at St. John's University School of Law, and among the
written contributors were Cheryl Hanna, Emily Sack, and Elayne Greenberg. They wrote about
new approaches, such as mediation and constitutional litigation. See 24 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT (2010).
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seeks to empower potential victims of domestic violence with information
so that they themselves can make choices that will avoid years of suffering
and abuse. The idea is to allow public access to the data registries main-
tained by state governments that contain the identities of the batterers who
either are or have been the subjects of final orders of protection. Today
almost all fifty states have such data registries in place. In some of them,
public access already exists, albeit usually with certain restrictions; in other
states, there is no public access at all. The novelty of the idea is not in the
compilation and storage of the information; rather, the uniqueness of the
proposal is its call to expand access and to publicize widely the fact of such
access as a way to reduce the future incidence of domestic violence.
Expanding access unleashes the potential of information as a preemp-
tive weapon. When a person meets someone attractive, and with whom
she is contemplating a romantic, intimate relationship, she can access the
state data registries to see if that person has ever had a final order of pro-
tection issued against him. She can do this search alongside the more
familiar Internet tools of Google, MySpace and Facebook with the same
purpose of finding out more information about the person of interest. The
hope is that if she discovers that such person is subject to a final order of
protection, she can then preclude any further interactions with that person
to avoid being a future victim of intimate partner abuse. Armed with
information, hopefully she chooses not to pursue a romantic relationship
in her own self-interest.
This proposal is inspired by several different developments in
American society and in criminal law, including the increasing use of the
Internet to gain information and form judgments about others. The pro-
posal also calls for the criminal justice system to function as a system that
not only punishes but also empowers. It does so by using the Internet to
expand and deepen the reach of public condemnation and to be more
specific in its condemnation. Enhanced public condemnation will deter
more tendencies toward violence and provide greater incentives to reha-
bilitate. Most importantly, it will reduce intimate violence. By doing so,
the proposal addresses the stagnancy of the domestic violence movement,
particularly in the massive infrastructure states have built upon orders of
protection. Building on these trends, this proposal warrants further exam-
ination. This article begins that discussion.
Naturally, this discussion will review not only the benefits, but also the
negative implications of greater public access to official information
about individuals. Many of these implications are not new, but have been
part of similar pro-access ideas in other non-Internet contexts.' I will dis-
7. For example, in August 2007, the ABA's Commission on Effective Criminal Sanctions
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cuss these longstanding interests as well as some new ones that are
specific to the domestic violence context.
Part H begins with a description of the current state of domestic vio-
lence and the movement against it in the United States. It takes a closer
look at the history of orders of protection, the massive legal structures that
have developed around them, and the disturbing ramifications of the
recent Supreme Court case, Castle Rock v. Gonzalez.
Part III lays out in greater detail the proposal and its underlying vision
for criminal justice. Specifically, I make the argument for why public
access to stigmatizing information is appropriate and sensible in the
domestic violence context. Given what we know about the realities of
domestic violence, a preemptive, preventive measure is a promising new
direction. Part IV then discusses the various concerns raised by the pro-
posal. They range from concerns for the victims of domestic violence on
an individual as well as collective level to worries about the infringements
of the rights of batterers and the implications for society. Finally, part V
offers a brief conclusion.
II. Providing Public Access to Order-of-Protection Registries
A. Current Levels of Domestic Violence and the Movement Against It
In 1995 and 1996, surveyors interviewed 8,000 men and 8,000 women
from all fifty states and the District of Columbia in a national study on
domestic violence, called the National Violence Against Women Survey.8
This important work offered a look at domestic violence, which did not
rely on police reports, emergency room statistics, or other sources of
information that are susceptible to underreporting and other self-selection
problems. The authors of the subsequent report, Patricia Tjaden and
Nancy Thoennes, highlighted certain statistics. "Nearly 25% of surveyed
women and 7.6% of surveyed men said they were raped and/or physical-
ly assaulted by a partner in the previous 12 months. . . . [Aipproximately
1.5 million women and 834,732 men are raped and/or physically assault-
ed by an intimate partner annually in the United States." 9 Although both
proposed that public access to criminal records be narrowed by eliminating access to records of
dismissed or acquitted indictments and older convictions where sentences had been completed.
See Tony Mauro, ABA Commission Pulls Proposal on Criminal Records, LEGAL TIMES, Aug.
11, 2007. The objective of the Commission was to enable more successful reentry of criminals
into their communities. See id. Interestingly, when media interests complained about the pro-
posed restrictions on access to government records and when business interests voiced their
interests in conducting background checks, the Commission withdrew its proposal. See id.
8. See Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes, U.S. Dep't of Just., NC 181867, Extent,
Nature, and Consequences of Intimate Partner Violence, at 1-2 (2000), available at http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/ 181867.htm.
9. See id. at iii.
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men and women are victims, they stressed that "[w]omen experience
more intimate partner violence than do men" and that "[w]omen experi-
ence more chronic and injurious physical assaults at the hands of intimate
partners than do men."' 0
As startling as these numbers may be, they are part of both good and
bad news in domestic violence. The good news is that since the mid-
1970s, domestic violence has been on the decline. For instance, the num-
ber of women killed by their intimate partner has fallen from 1,587 in
1976, to 1,181 in 2005, and the number of men killed by their intimate
partner has fallen from 1,304 in 1976, to 329 in 2005." Nonfatal partner
violence has also experienced a significant decrease from 5.8 per 1,000
persons as victims in 1993, to 2.3 per 1,000 persons in 2005.12 Both the
rates of simple and aggravated assaults committed against women by their
intimate partners declined by two-thirds between 1993 and 2005.Y
The bad news is that there still remains a lot of intimate partner vio-
lence. From May through November 1998, the Commonwealth Fund 4
conducted a national survey of 2,850 women and 1,500 men on the status
of health care for women in this country." Almost one out of every three
women in the survey reported having been the victim of domestic vio-
lence at some point in their lives. The rates varied somewhat across socio-
economic classes, but were still high for all classes: "One of four women
with incomes above $50,000 . . . reported domestic abuse in her lifetime
by a spouse or boyfriend, as did 37% of women with incomes of $16,000
or less."' 6 The rates were relatively similar when comparing across edu-
cation levels, race and ethnicity, and geographic locations.17
10. See id. at iii-iv.
11. See U.S. Dep't of Just., Bureau of Just. Statistics, Homicide Trends in the U.S., avail-
able at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs//homicide/tables/intimatestab.htm. Interestingly, different
race and gender groups experience these declines in homicide from 1976 to 2005 differently.
"[Tlhe number of black males killed by intimates dropped by 83%, white males by 61%, black
females by 52%, and white females by 6%." See id.
12. See U.S. Dep't of Just., Bureau of Just. Statistics, Intimate Partner Violence in the U.S.,
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/intimate/table/totipv.htm.
13. See id. at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/intimate/circumstances.htm.
14. "The Commonwealth Fund is a private foundation that aims to promote a high per-
forming health care system that achieves better access, improved quality, and greater efficien-
cy, particularly for society's most vulnerable, including low-income people, the uninsured,
minority Americans, young children, and elderly adults." See http://www.commonwealthfund.
org/aboutus/.
15. See Karen Scott Collins, et al., Health Concerns Across a Woman's Lifespan: The
Commonwealth Fund 1998 Survey of Women's Health, May 1999 at ix, available at http://
www.commonwealthfund.org/usr-doclHealthconcernssurveyreport.pdfsection4039.
16. See id. at 8.
17. See id.
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These statistics are still very high despite decades of significant legal
change and dedication of public resources to the crisis of domestic vio-
lence.'8 While incidents have decreased, they still occur with alarming
regularity. The prospects for much more significant reductions in domes-
tic abuse are weak. Continuing levels of domestic violence indicate a
plateau in our fight against domestic violence in the United States.
The plateau is not the only problem. In addition, the domestic violence
movement is deeply embroiled in internal conceptual and political con-
tests.19 Over the last several years, scholars and advocates have exchanged
views on whether the legal reforms of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s have
been effective at reducing violence. Many agree that the primary legal
approach has been to rely on the criminal justice system to combat inti-
mate abuse. 20 Past that minimum common ground, there are critical dis-
agreements. Has the criminal justice approach been successful? 2' Have
the successes come at the cost of the autonomy of the victims of domes-
tic abuse? 22 Has the criminal justice approach reached its maximum utili-
ty? What other strategies and approaches should we explore? A recent
symposium at St. John's University School of Law gathered some of the
18. "These improvements include legislation authorizing warrantless arrests in domestic
violence misdemeanors, increased numbers of shelters for battered women and their children,
and more sensitive custody rules in family courts." See Elaine M. Chiu, Confronting the Agency
in Battered Mothers, 74 So. CAL. L. REv. 1223, 1224 (2001).
19. See, e.g., G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence
and the Conservatization of the Battered Women's Movement, 42 Hous. L. REv. 237, 241-42
(2005) (summarizing the diametrically opposed positions on mandatory arrest policies);
Deborah M. Weissman, The Personal is Political--and Economic: Rethinking Domestic
Violence, 2007 B.Y.U.L. REV. 387, 391-406 (2007).
20. See Miccio, supra note 19 at 263-67. Civil options have also been developed but are
often overshadowed by the more dominant criminal response. See Joan Zorza, The Criminal
Law ofMisdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1979-1990, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46 (1992).
21. The most heated battlegrounds have been the mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution
policies. See Miccio, supra note 19 at 263-67. For supporters of mandatory policies, see, e.g.,
Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence
Prosecutions, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1849 (1996); Jennifer R. Adler, Note, Strengthening Victims
Rights in Domestic Violence Cases: An Argument for 30-Day Mandatory Restraining Orders in
Massachusetts, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 303 (1999); Angella Corsilles, Note, No-Drop Policies in
the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases: Guarantee to Action or Dangerous Solution?, 63
FORDHAM L. REv. 853 (1994). For criticisms of mandatory policies, see, e.g., ELIZABETH M.
SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 196 (2000) (expressing concerns about
the consequences of battered women's advocates working so closely with the state); Deborah
Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of
Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, II YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3 (1999); Linda G. Mills,
Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV.
550 (1999); Nichole M. Mordini, Note, Mandatory State Interventions for Domestic Abuse
Cases: An Examination of the Effects on Victim Safety and Autonomy 52 DRAKE L. REV. 295
(2004).
22. See, e.g., Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L. J. 2, 66-68 (2006).
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best thinkers in domestic violence to talk about new directions. 23 Among
the ideas raised was the use of noncriminal laws. The Scarlet Letter pro-
posal is one such idea because it utilizes civil laws such as restraining
orders and public access rules.
B. Orders of Protection: Then and Now
Restraining orders or orders of protection are one of the earliest
weapons of the domestic violence movement. They are an engrained part
of our popular culture. Celebrities and politicians have them issued
against stalkers and in their own intimate disputes.24 Essentially, orders of
protection are special judicial orders prohibiting particular individuals
from harming specified victims. They do so through no contact orders,
bans on communication, geographic limitations, etc. Judges issue such
orders only after they have found credible threats of violence in legal set-
tings with standard procedural protections.
Prior to 1976, restraining orders were only issued for intimate violence
where the parties to the order were in the process of getting divorced.25 In
1976, Pennsylvania was the first state to provide civil restraining orders to
battered women, whether or not they were married to their abusers and
whether or not they were getting divorced from their abusers.26 By 1994,
all fifty states had followed Pennsylvania's example. 27
The first studies on the effectiveness of orders of protection were con-
ducted in the 1980s; their conclusions were mostly negative but opti-
mistic. They noted the failure of restraining orders to reduce violence but
attributed the failure to issues of under-enforcement, statutory deficiencies
and continued procedural barriers.28 As legislatures and law enforcement
slowly responded with stiffer penalties, streamlined procedures, judicial
and police training, and greater police resources, more studies were done
to reexamine the effectiveness of restraining orders. Many of these later
23. See Thinking Outside the Box, supra note 6.
24. See Access Hollywood: Restraining Orders, http://www.accesshollywood.com/restrain-
ing-orders? source=omg (offering a list of articles on celebrities obtaining restraining orders).
25. See Janice Grau, Jeffrey Fagan & Sandra Wexler, Restraining Orders for Battered
Women: Issues ofAccess and Efficacy, 4 WOMEN & PoLmcs 13, 14 (1985).
26. See id. at 13-14.
27. See Susan L. Keilitz, Paula L. Hannaford & Hillery S. Efkeman, Civil Protection
Orders: The Benefits and Limitations for Victims ofDomestic Violence, at vii (Nat'l Center for
State Courts 1997).
28. See Women, Violence, and the Law: Hearing Before the House Comm. On Children,
Youth, and Families, 100th Cong. 76-78 (1987) (statement of Barbara J. Hart, staff counsel,
Penn. Coalition Against Domestic Violence); see id. at 31 (statement of Elizabeth Holtzman,
District Attorney, Kings County, New York) (outlining ways to make TROs more effective);
Grau, supra note 25, at 19, 25-27 (suggesting improvements such as clarifying court policies,
getting rid of procedural obstacles, increasing sanctions for violations of TROs, etc.).
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studies were still negative and, once again, laid the blame on procedural
and enforcement issues.2 9
The ineffectiveness of restraining orders meant harmful outcomes for
victims. Violations of restraining orders can range from a threatening
phone call to a vicious assault. More than 66.6% of the restraining orders
issued for women who had been raped or stalked and more than 50% of
the orders issued for assault victims were subsequently violated.30 The
American Bar Association reported that 60% of women with temporary
restraining orders reported the order violated within one year after the
order had been issued."
The freestanding exception to the chorus of negativity was an exhaus-
tive study conducted in 1994 in three cities (Wilmington, Delaware;
Denver, Colorado; and the District of Columbia) by the National Center for
State Courts.32 Unlike other national studies, researchers in this one meas-
ured the effectiveness of protection orders in two ways: the improvement
in the quality of women's lives, as reported by them and the subsequent
extent of problems related to the grounds for the order of protection. 3 3 The
results were positive on both fronts. Almost 75% of study participants
reported positively when asked whether their lives had improved, whether
they felt better about themselves, and whether they felt safer.3 4 This num-
ber jumped to 85% when these same questions were asked in six-month
follow-up interviews.35 Over 70% and over 65% of study participants
reported no subsequent physical or psychological abuse in the initial and
follow-up interviews. 3 6 Some 35.5% of participants who did not return to
court to get their temporary restraining orders converted into permanent
orders explained that their abusers had stopped bothering them. 37
Notably, the incidence of repeated abuse did vary greatly across the
three cities that were studied. Participants were asked whether there
were any repeat incidents of the behavior that led them to seek a restrain-
ing order in the first place. 39 They were asked this question within the first
29. See, e.g., Peter Finn & Sarah Colson, Civil Protection Orders: Legislation, Current
Court Practice, and Enforcement 49 (1990) (stating that enforcement, "the Achille's heel" of
TROs, was not taking place "in most of the jurisdictions examined").
30. See Tjaden & Thoennes, supra note 8, at 53-54.
31. See American Bar Assoc., Legal Interventions in Family Violence: Research Findings
and Policy Implications, RESEARCH REPORT, 27, (1998) NCJ 171666.
32. See Keilitz, et al., supra note 27, at vii.
33. See id. at viii-ix.
34. See id at ix.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id. at xiii.
38. See id. at ix.
39. See id. at viii-ix.
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month of securing the protection order and then again, six months later.40
Some 10.9% of study participants suffered repeated physical abuse in
Delaware, and 11.9% of participants in the District of Columbia, whereas
only 2% of participants in Denver did so.41 Psychological abuse recurred
at even higher levels, but still showed the same variance across locales
(Delaware at 23.6%, the District of Columbia at 1.7%, and Denver at
13.3%). Finally, the most frequently reported problem by participants was
phone calls. Abusers called victims at home 16.1% of the time, at work
17.4% of the time, and visited them at home 9% of the time within the first
six months of the restraining orders.42
The response to the National Center for State Courts study was meas-
ured. Eve S. Buzawa and Carl. G. Buzawa wrote that TROs were still
largely ineffective, despite the study's findings of positive psychological
benefits for victims through empowerment. "If we examine 'effective-
ness' on the basis of preventing further acts of violence, little positive
impact is shown by these studies." 43 Even the authors of the National
Center for State Courts acknowledged that results were mixed and ulti-
mately concluded that much more can still be done to realize the full
potential of protection orders."
As of 2005, the effectiveness of restraining orders in reducing domes-
tic violence was tenuous at best. This grim situation took a turn for the
worse when the Supreme Court issued its bombshell ruling in the case of
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzalez in 2005.45 In this case, a state trial court
issued a temporary restraining order as part of divorce proceedings
between Jessica and Simon Gonzalez, directing the husband not to
"molest or disturb the peace of [respondent] or of any child," and to
remain at least 100 yards from the family home at all times."46 The court
then made this restraining order permanent while also providing for visi-
tation time between Simon Gonzalez and his three daughters (ages 10, 9
and 7).47 The visitation time included midweek dinner visits that were
arranged ahead of time by the parties and allowed Simon to come to
Jessica's home to pick up and drop off the girls.48
According to the complaint, at about 5:00 or 5:30 p.m. on Tuesday,
40. See id. at viii.
41. See id. at x.
42. See id.
43. See EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
RESPONSE 242-43 (3d ed. 2003).
44. See Keilitz, et al., supra note 27, at xiii-xv.
45. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
46. See id. at 751.
47. See id. at 752-53.
48. See id.
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June 22, 1999, respondent's husband took the three daughters while they
were playing outside the family home. No advance arrangements had
been made for him to see the daughters that evening. When respondent
noticed the children were missing, she suspected her husband had taken
them. At about 7:30 p.m., she called the Castle Rock Police Department,
which dispatched two officers. The complaint continues: "When [the
officers] arrived . . . , she showed them a copy of the TRO and requested
that it be enforced and the three children be returned to her immediately.
[The officers] stated that there was nothing they could do about the TRO
and suggested that [respondent] call the Police Department again if the
three children did not return home by 10:00 p.m."
At approximately 8:30 p.m., respondent talked to her husband on his
cellular telephone. He told her "he had the three children [at an] amuse-
ment park in Denver." She called the police again and asked them to
"have someone check for" her husband or his vehicle at the amusement
park and "put out an [all points bulletin]" for her husband, but the officer
with whom she spoke "refused to do so," again telling her to "wait until
10:00 p.m. and see if' her husband returned the girls.
At approximately 10:10 p.m., respondent called the police and said her
children were still missing, but she was now told to wait until midnight.
She called at midnight and told the dispatcher her children were still miss-
ing. She went to her husband's apartment and, finding nobody there,
called the police at 12:10 a.m.; she was told to wait for an officer to arrive.
When none came, she went to the police station at 12:50 a.m. and sub-
mitted an incident report. The officer who took the report "made no rea-
sonable effort to enforce the TRO or locate the three children. Instead, he
went to dinner."
At approximately 3:20 a.m., respondent's husband arrived at the police
station and opened fire with a semiautomatic handgun he had purchased
earlier that evening. Police shot back, killing him. Inside the cab of his
pickup truck, they found the bodies of all three daughters, whom he had
already murdered.4 9
Jessica Gonzalez on her own and on behalf of her three deceased chil-
dren sued the police department in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action on grounds
that they had violated her constitutionally protected rights to substantive
and procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by failing
to enforce the order of protection.50 Because the lower federal courts had
rejected the substantive claim, the Supreme Court only analyzed the pro-
cedural claim and specifically considered whether Ms. Gonzalez had any
49. See id. at 753-54 (quoting and citing the appellant's petition for certiorari).
50. See id. at 754-55.
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protected property interest in the enforcement of her restraining order. On
the back of the orders issued against Simon Gonzalez, there was preprint-
ed language directed to law enforcement officials that the Colorado legis-
lature had approved for every restraining order. Labeled "Notice to Law
Enforcement Officials," this language read:
YOU SHALL USE EVERY REASONABLE MEANS TO ENFORCE THIS
RESTRAINING ORDER. YOU SHALL ARREST, OR, IF AN ARREST
WOULD BE IMPRACTICAL UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, SEEK A
WARRANT FOR THE ARREST OF THE RESTRAINED PERSON WHEN
YOU HAVE INFORMATION AMOUNTING TO PROBABLE CAUSE
THAT THE RESTRAINED PERSON HAS VIOLATED OR ATTEMPTED
TO VIOLATE ANY PROVISION OF THIS ORDER AND THE
RESTRAINED PERSON HAS BEEN PROPERLY SERVED WITH A COPY
OF THIS ORDER OR HAS RECEIVED ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE EXIS-
TENCE OF THIS ORDER.51
In spite of the plain meaning of this language, Justice Scalia wrote that
they "do not believe that these provisions of Colorado law truly made
enforcement of restraining orders mandatory."52 Even considering the
strong push toward mandatory arrest laws for domestic violence, the
Court rested on the fact that Simon Gonzalez was never present at any of
the times that Jessica Gonzalez was asking for assistance from the police.
They never had the opportunity to arrest him.53 When the subject of the
restraining order was not present, it is unclear and ambiguous as to what
exact procedures Jessica Gonzalez was entitled. Thus, the Court conclud-
ed that there is not a constitutionally protected property interest in the
enforcement of orders of protection.54 Without a constitutional right,
Jessica Gonzalez and her children did not have a section 1983 claim.
When enforcement problems have been at the center of why we have
not realized the full potential of restraining orders, the Castle Rock ruling
is enormously troubling. Mandating certain responses and eliminating
human discretion are key components of the criminal justice approach to
domestic violence. They are inherent in the mandatory arrest and no-drop
prosecution policies, but also are essential for the restraining order
regime. Prior to Castle Rock, advocates and victims assumed that the
police had to arrest or at least take good faith, reasonable steps toward
arrest when informed of a violation of an existing order of protection.
After all, without this mandatory enforcement, the restraining order
regime would be vulnerable to the same misogynistic stereotypes and
biases that plagued family violence prior to the feminist movement.
51. See id. at 752.
52. See id. at 760.
53. See id. at 762-63.
54. See id. at 763-64.
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Castle Rock has negated this assumption. Arrest and police action are not
mandatory.
Because they are not mandatory, victims of police failures like Jessica
Gonzalez and her three young daughters cannot sue for damages. The lack
of a financial penalty is also disturbing. An important part of the history
of the movement against domestic violence were multimillion dollar law-
suits against police departments for failure to arrest and to prosecute for
violent acts committed by husbands against their wives. Only after some
plaintiff wives won their lawsuits did police departments around the coun-
try begin to transform their practices and adopt mandatory arrest policies
for domestic violence. The "money talks" strategy worked. As a result of
Castle Rock, it is no longer a viable strategy to secure the enforcement of
restraining orders.
Without a constitutional right to mandatory enforcement and the threat
of money damages, the future of restraining orders is vulnerable and far
from bright. Are protection orders doomed to being ineffective historical
relics of an outdated criminal justice approach to intimate violence? The
Scarlet Letter proposal hopes to reverse this downward direction by capi-
talizing on the extant restraining order regime and yet not relying on man-
dates and enforceable constitutional rights. Instead, the proposal uses the
rich compilation of information in our restraining order regime to empow-
er citizens to protect themselves. In part III, I lay out the details and the
underlying values of the proposal.
III. The Scarlet Letter Proposal
A. What Is the Proposal?
Once an order of protection is issued, many states record its issuance in
a database." The database might be a special database created for orders
of protection or the database can be the state's criminal history database
used for all crimes including domestic violence. As a general matter, pub-
lic access to the specialized databases either does not exist or exists in
very limited form. For the criminal history databases, states vary widely
in how much access they grant to the public. There are open states, like
Minnesota, where anyone can conduct a free search for criminal convic-
tions and sentences.56 There are also closed states, like Massachusetts,
55. See National Center for State Courts and the Full Faith and Credit Project of the
Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence, State and U.S. Territory Full Faith and
Credit Legislation and Registry Information, at http://www.vaw.umn.eduldocuments/ffc/ ffc-
matrfin/ffcmatrfin.html#idl25031 (Jan. 2002); see also State survey conducted by research
assistant on file with author.
56. See Minnesota Public Criminal History, https://cch.state.mn.us/.
That Guy's a Batterer 267
where only certain members of the public, such as daycare employers
can access the criminal history database.5 7 Random individuals in
Massachusetts cannot. I will focus on New York State as a case study for
purposes of explaining how the proposal might work with an actual juris-
diction. New York has both a specialized order of protection database and
a general purpose criminal history database.
In 1994, the New York State legislature passed the Family Protection
and Domestic Violence Intervention Act. Among its several reforms was
the creation of the New York State Family Protection Registry [the
"Registry"]." In New York State, the family court, the supreme court, and
the criminal court have the authority to issue a restraining order. The
Registry, which became operational in October 1995, is the repository for
all orders of protection issued by these courts pursuant to various author-
izing statutes.59 In 2005 alone, 123,649 orders of protection (temporary
and final) were entered into the Registry. The Registry is a historic record
and thus, even expired orders of protection stay in the Registry. As of
2006, the total number of orders of protection in the Registry was
1,411,264.60
There is limited access to the Registry. Only designated state officials,
such as court personnel, police officers, and assistant district attorney, are
allowed access.6' The system is protected through passwords, and users
must be trained. The limited access is explained by the original purpose
for the Registry: to aid in the coordination of various state agencies and
actors in their interactions with violent families.62 For instance, when a
police officer responds to an emergency call for domestic violence, very
often the civilians on the scene will be extremely emotional and dis-
traught. In many instances, the civilians will talk about orders of protec-
tion. Equally common is the fact that the civilians will no longer have a
57. See Criminal Offender Record Information: CORI Unit Overview, http://www.mass.
gov/?pagelD=eopsterminal&L=4&LO=Home&L I =Crime+Prevention+%26+Personal+Safety
&L2=Background+Check&L3=Criminal+Offender+Record+Information+%28CORI%29&sid
=Eeops&b=terminalcontent&f=chsbcori home&csid=Eeops.
58. See NYS Office for the Prevention of Domestic Violence (OPDV), New York State's
Response to Domestic Violence: Systems and Services Making a Difference, available at http://
www.opdv.state.ny.us/whatisdv/about-dv/nyresponse/ (2006).
59. In New York State, these statutes include articles four, five, six, and eight of the Family
Court Act, § 530.12 of the Criminal Procedure Law, §§ 240 and 252 of the Domestic Relations
Law and all arrest warrants issued pursuant to § 827 of the Family Court Act and Art. 120 of
the Criminal Procedure Law. See id.
60. See id.
61. See The Family Protection and Domestic Violence Intervention Act Informational
Letter at 3 (June 23, 1995), http://www.ocfs.state.ny.us/main/policies/extemal/1995/INFs/95-
INF-20%2OThe%2OFamily%20Protection%20and%20Domestic%20Violence%20
Intervention%2OAct.pdf.
62. See id.
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copy of the order of protection. Without concrete evidence of the exis-
tence or details of the order of protection, it is difficult for the responding
officer to sort out whether a crime has occurred and what crime or crimes
have occurred. The Registry is critical as a resource for officers in such
situations.
In addition to being recorded in the Registry, orders of protection that
are issued as part of a criminal sentence are also noted in New York
State's criminal history records. New York State is an open state that
gives public access to its conviction and sentencing records.63 Thus, mem-
bers of the public currently can discover information aboutfinal orders of
protection that are issued as part of the sentence for a criminal convic-
tion.6 Final orders of protection are valid for eight years from date of
issuance for felony convictions or for five years from the date of issuance
for misdemeanor convictions. 65 The information about final orders of pro-
tection issued by the criminal courts should be duplicative of the infor-
mation in the Registry, but happens to be accessible by the public only by
virtue of appearing in the criminal history records. In contrast, final orders
of protection issued by family court or by the supreme court are not acces-
sible by the public.
Operationally, the Scarlet Letter proposal then is fairly simple: to make
selective information from the Registry available to the public, along with
the information already available from the criminal history records. The
public will be able to access the identities of the abusers who received a
final order of protection from any court at any time.6 6 It would not matter
if the final order was issued by a criminal court or a civil court or if the
order lasted for five years, three years, or two years. The only requirement
is that it is a final order of protection. The reason for this is the greater pro-
cedural rigor of final orders over temporary orders.6 ' The proposal would
not make accessible to the public the identities of the parties in whose pro-
tection the orders were issued. This would be kept inaccessible or secret.
The database should be searchable by full name along with a date of birth.
These search terms are in line with how many open states, including New
York, currently allow searches on their criminal history databases.68
63. See New York State Unified Court System Criminal History Record Search,
http://www.nycourts.gov/apps/chrs/index.shtml.
64. Criminal courts issue temporary orders of protection or ex parte orders of protection
only during the pendency of cases.
65. See N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 530.13(4) (2010).
66. See infra section IV E for a discussion about how rehabilitated batterers may take their
names off the list.
67. See infra text accompanying notes.
68. See New York State Unified Court System Criminal History Record Search, http://
www.nycourts.gov/apps/chrs/index.shtml (last visited July 29, 2010).
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B. The Underlying Theories and Values of the Proposal
This proposal is based on a particular vision of the criminal justice sys-
tem that encompasses two specific ideals: (1) the transparency and acces-
sibility of public institutions and (2) the empowerment of the individual
citizen.
1. TRANSPARENCY AND ACCESS OF PUBLIC INsTITUTIONS
Courts are the originating authority for orders of protection and courts
are obviously state institutions. As officers of the court, judges act in the
name of the state and are state representatives. Their judicial actions then
ought to be known to constituents of the states, namely to individual citi-
zens. Thus, the issuance of an order of protection along with the details of
the order should be readily available to the public, barring any other coun-
tervailing interests. Indeed, the First Amendment includes a presumptive
right of access to court records.69 On a certain level, current court practice
already reflects this commitment to public access and the public right to
know.70 By and large, members of the public can go into any criminal
court and watch and listen to the proceedings." They do not need prior
approval from the judge or any stake in the proceedings. This includes
courtrooms where orders of protection are issued and the names of bat-
terers are announced out loud.
Upholding the public, transparent nature of the courts and judges is
important to the pursuit of criminal justice. Both utilitarian and retribu-
tivist goals rely on this public nature. For example, specific and general
deterrence are more effectively achieved if the penalty imposed for crim-
inal conduct is known to be imposed on certain named individuals.72 The
publicized penalty is arguably more significant for the named individuals
because of the additional public shaming. The publicized penalty may
also be more tangible and credible for others in the general population.
The deterrent effect may be particularly strong for those who know or
know of the named individuals.73 To be aware that robbery is generally
69. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, 868 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1989) (severely restricting
the discretion of judges to seal criminal history records from public view in the Massachusetts
open database).
70. For a discussion of other similar practices with respect to accessing written court docu-
ments, see supra text accompanying notes 107-15.
71. See U.S. CONsT. amend. VI; see also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S.
501, 505-11(1984).
72. See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV.
733 (1998); Note, The Eighth Amendment, Proportionality, and the Changing Meaning of
"Punishments," 122 HARV. L. REV. 960 (2009); Deterrent Effect of Publicity, JERSEY EVENING
PosT, Sept. 18, 2009, http://www.thisisjersey.coml2009/09/18/deterrent-effect-of-publicity/.
73. See Alan Calnan, The Instrumental Justice of Private Law, 78 UMKC L. REv. 559, 594
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punished by a ten-year imprisonment is one thing; to be aware that your
neighbor, Bob Smith, did ten years in jail for a robbery conviction is
another.
There are, of course, countervailing interests that may outweigh the
ideal of a publicly accessible criminal justice system. For example, long
and heated debates have taken place over cameras in the courtrooms, and
in particular, criminal courtrooms. 74 Another discussion has been the
accommodation of the need to maintain the secret identities of undercov-
er law enforcement agents when they are called as witnesses in otherwise
public trials.7 ' Later in part IV, I discuss the particular countervailing
interests posed by the Scarlet Letter proposal. However, none of these
concerns rise to a level that outweighs the public safety benefits of the
proposal. Indeed, unlike the undercover witness situation, the safety con-
cerns lead to public access to the orders of protection. The more the pub-
lic is aware of the identities of batterers, the more individual citizens can
take measures to protect themselves. The more transparent the criminal
justice system, the more deterrence is achieved. This leads to the second
ideal espoused by the Scarlet Letter proposal.
2. EMPOWERMENT OF INDIVIDUAL CITIZEN
There are thousands of individuals employed in law enforcement in the
United States.7 6 While we undoubtedly need their services to enforce our
penal laws, we do not leave our penal laws and the larger criminal justice
system in their hands alone. There are numerous instances where individ-
ual citizenry are called to participate. One example is the criminal trial
jury.77 Another is the power of citizen arrests whereby the direct enforce-
ment of penal laws by citizens is recognized and respected.
The proposal agrees with this vision of a responsible and empowered
citizenry. Individuals should not have to rely solely on law enforcement
(2010) (noting that people receive their most important social cues from family, friends, and
neighbors, which has led to a resurgence of shaming as a punishment for crime).
74. See, e.g., Beth Chesterman, Restrictions on Courtroom News Coverage, http://www.
firstamendmenteenter.orglanalysis.aspx?id=17283; Douglas Lee, Cameras in the Courtroom,
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/Press/topic.aspx?topic=camerascourtroom.
75. See, e.g., Brown v. Artuz, 283 F.3d 492, 502 (2d Cir. 2002) (interest in preserving secre-
cy of undercover officer's identity and ensuring his safety justified closure during his testimony).
76. See Crime in the United States 2004: Law Enforcement Personnel, http://www.fbi.gov/
ucr/cius 04/lawenforcement_personnellindex.html (last visited July 29, 2010) (offering a
number of charts indicating the number of law enforcement personnel in the US, broken down
by city size and location).
77. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to be judged by a jury of peers in a crimi-
nal prosecution. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
78. Similar to other states, New York State provides a formal defense for the use of physi-
cal force by a citizen in effecting an arrest. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL L. § 35.30(3) & (4) (2009).
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officials to enforce restraining orders but rather they should be able to
"enforce" these orders themselves. By providing access to the registries,
the proposal arms citizens with information-namely, the identities of
known batterers. Citizens are then able to preempt being a victim of
domestic abuse by either steering clear of such batterers or by being more
wary in their interactions with them. If the goal of the restraining orders
is to reduce domestic violence, citizens can help to do that themselves.
Equally important to the empowerment of citizenry is respect for that
citizenry. While this proposal enables individual citizens, it does not oblige
them. In other words, providing access to information does not require an
individual to modify his or her behavior accordingly, but rather, offers the
opportunity to do so. The proposal gives prospective victims a critical tool
to avoid known batterers and thus, to avoid the likelihood of intimate vio-
lence in their lives; but, it also respects their autonomy. Potential victims
can choose not to access the database or, even if they do and discover neg-
ative information, they can choose to ignore this information and to have
intimate relationships, nonetheless, with known abusers. The choice is
entirely up to them.79 While the proposal does rely heavily on the self-
interest of prospective victims, it is designed as a tool of respectful empow-
erment and not of obligation. Thus, the proposal nimbly traverses the
treacherous dilemma between treating victims as autonomous, rational
beings, and regarding them as dysfunctional, untrustworthy, irrational
actors. This dilemma has long divided the domestic violence community
and is often a criticism lodged against various laws and policies.80
The proposal is deliberately designed to be a prime example of the lib-
ertarian paternalism theory espoused by Professors Richard Thaler and
Cass Sunstein in their recent book, Nudge: Improving Decisions About
Health, Wealth and Happiness.' By designing thoughtful choice archi-
79. If some individuals choose not to access the information or to ignore the revelation that
their intimate partner has a history of battering, it may well turn out that they will be actual vic-
tims themselves. The proposal, though, does not contemplate that because they failed to heed
the warning, that they would then lose the protection of the laws. Other existing mechanisms,
such as mandatory arrest and custody presumptions, should certainly still be available. In a real
meaningful sense, the proposal respects the autonomy of individuals to make their own intimate
choices without punishing them for having made bad choices.
80. See, e.g., Epstein, Effective Intervention, supra note 21 (discussing in part an anti-
domestic violence victim bias among court professionals in the context of mandatory
intervention laws); Mills, Killing Her Softly, supra note 21 (providing a comparison between
interactions by court professionals and interactions by medical professionals dealing with
domestic violence victims, and noting that mandatory intervention laws can be harmful because
they remove power from victims, somewhat mirroring the domestic violence dynamic between
abuser and victim); Mordini, Note Mandatory State Interventions, supra note 21 (analyzing the
effect that mandatory intervention laws have on domestic violence victim safety and autonomy).
81. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONs ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
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tecture in its laws and policies, society can nudge individuals to make
beneficial decisions for themselves without restricting their freedom of
choice. Access to information is the choice architecture that provides that
nudge. An empowered, participatory citizenry is yet another ideal for a
criminal justice system, and this public access proposal helps to achieve it.
In addition to these two ideals, the Scarlet Letter proposal also works
towards a final and ultimate goal: the very real reduction of the incidence
of domestic violence beyond our present plateau. Part III C now turns to
why the proposal has a realistic chance of success in achieving this goal.
C. How the Proposal Works with the Realities of Domestic Violence
During the past three decades, we have learned a great deal from the
many studies about violent families. One powerful observation is that vio-
lent families vary widely in their composition, in the frequency of their
abuse, in the intensity of the violence, in the pattern of their fighting, in
their economic and social characteristics, in their educational back-
grounds, etc.82 Although Dr. Lenore Walker's work on the battered
women syndrome is the most broadly known theory, it is far from being
the only one and for many violent families, it is far from accurate.83
At the risk of essentializing all violent families to one model, I set forth
two recurring observations that we see in many (although not all) violent
families and relationships. The first observation is that many batterers will
batter again. The second observation is that when the violence or abuse
first occurs, and then at each subsequent abusive incident, couples are
often already in a close and entangled relationship. The dependencies and
emotions of such relationships make it extremely difficult to exit the rela-
tionships. These two observations combine to make domestic violence
such a difficult social problem to solve. The Scarlet Letter proposal is
unlike many other past reforms because its potential lies in working with-
in these realities and not against them.
1. BATTERERS WILL BATTER AGAIN
Knowing the identities of individuals who have been subjected to a
final order of protection is only helpful if that information has a predictive
value. Because the truth is that a high proportion of batterers abuse vic-
tims over and over, there is tremendous predictive value.
The phrases repeat batterers and serial batterers describe abusers who
82. See, e.g., MURRAY STRAUS, RICHARD GELLES & SUZANNE STEINMEIZ, BEHIND CLOSED
DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY (1980).
83. See Bettina Boxall, Abuse Expert Stirs Uproar with Simpson Defense Role Trial, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 29, 1995, http://articles.latimes.com/1995-01-29/news/mn-25821_Ibattered-
women.
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engage in two distinct phenomena. Repeat batterers are those abusers who
keep abusing their victims, even though they have already been the sub-
ject of legal actions, whether civil or criminal, for their behavior toward
those victims. Repeat battering is also known as reabuse. Serial batterers
are abusers who have multiple victims. They batter more than one person
with whom they are intimate or romantically involved. Serial batterers can
commit such abuse serially meaning they move from one victim to the
next and, thus, are only abusing one victim at a time. In actuality though
there are "serial" batterers who abuse multiple victims at the same time.
They would still be categorized as "serial" batterers in studies.
An abuser can be either a repeat or a serial batterer or both or neither.
The two categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, Adam can
physically attack and emotionally torment Beatrix, and Beatrix can go
into court and obtain a civil restraining order against Adam. If Adam con-
tinues to emotionally and physically abuse Beatrix, despite the issuance of
the order, then he is a repeat batterer. If he also batters another victim,
Cindy, at the same time he is battering Beatrix, or shortly thereafter, he is
also a serial batterer.
Many batterers are repeat batterers.' This has been well-documented
by numerous studies." Its incidence is not questioned;86 instead, what
continues to stir controversy are the predictors of reabuse. Numerous
studies have examined individual level characteristics, including demo-
graphics and criminal history, interpersonal variables about the nature of
the relationship between the batterer and the victim, and systemic variables
that cover myriad ways a batterer and victim may engage with the legal
system. The results of these studies are inconclusive and not helpful as
to the exact causes of repeat battering. For instance, in 2000, Professors
White and Gondolf published a paper that allegedly confirmed that most
men who recidivate exhibit dysfunctional personality types,8 ' but then in
2001, the same two professors published a second article stating that the
causal connection between recidivisim and psychopathic tendencies is
84. Studies of reabuse report that it occurs in 20.5% to 93% of relationships they observed.
The wide variance of the results is due to many design differences, including source of sample
population, length of follow-up, and retention rate. See Lauren Bennett Cattanco & Lisa A.
Goodman, Risk Factors for Reabuse in Intimate Partner Violence: A Cross-Disciplinary Critical
Review 6 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 141, 158-59 (2005).
85. See id. at 141. This work has been done by criminologists, clinical and community psy-
chologists, and public health professionals among others. See id. at 142.
86. See id. at 158 (describing how studies vary on how they measure or document reabuse;
some use rearrest, some use arrest for any new crime, some use new physical assaults as report-
ed by victims, even when they do not result in arrests).
87. See id. at 159-64.
88. See Robert J. White & Edward W. Gondolf, Implications of Personality Profiles for
Batterer Treatment, 15 J. INTERPERS. VIOLENCE 467, 483 (2000).
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more attenuated than first conceived.89
In contrast to repeat battering, serial battering has received much less
empirical and scholarly attention. In my days as an assistant district attor-
ney prosecuting domestic violence cases, I often heard about serial bat-
terers from their victims. Many women would tell me about the day they
finally met their abuser's ex-wife or ex-girlfriend and how they learned
that he had actually battered and abused them, too, in much the same way.
Specially trained domestic violence police officers at the local precincts
would describe their familiarity with the abuse patterns of certain batter-
ers because of the revolving door of victims who would be hurt by them.
The Massachusetts Office of the Commissioner of Probation has con-
ducted two studies that provide some statistical evidence of serial batter-
ing. In the first study, they looked at the identities of the offenders and vic-
tims of all restraining orders issued for intimate violence from 1992 to
1998 and found that almost one out of every four offenders had two or
more unrelated victims.90 One serial batterer had as many as eight differ-
ent victims over a six-year period.91 This first study noted that these
offenders either victimized more than one person at a time or moved seri-
ally from one victim to the next, and so on. 92 A second study released in
2004 looked at all the restraining orders that were issued in 1998 and fol-
lowed the criminal history of those offenders thereafter. 93 This study pro-
duced even more alarming numbers. Some 43% of these offenders had
two or more victims who were unrelated in their history of civil restrain-
ing orders.94 Anywhere from one out of four batterers to two out of five
batterers are serial batterers with multiple victims.
For the purposes of the Scarlet Letter proposal, the phenomenon serial
battering is more interesting than repeat battering. Serial battering sup-
ports the view that abuse goes beyond simply interpersonal factors or the
interaction between two particular people. It suggests that abusers them-
selves have certain demographics, personalities, afflictions, or problems
that they carry around as they move from one romantic partner to the next.
What is most appalling about these stories and statistics, though, is the
ease with which serial batterers move from one victim to the next to the
89. See Edward W. Gondolf & Robert J. White, Barterer Program Participants Who
Repeatedly Assault: Psychopathic Tendencies and Other Disorders, 16 J. INTERPERS. VIOLENCE
361, 375 (2001).
90. See SANDY ADAMS, SERIAL BATTERERS (1999) (published by the Massachusetts Office
of the Commissioner of Probation).
9 1. See id.
92. See id.
93. See STEPHEN BOCKO ET AL., RESTRAINING ORDER VIOLATORS, CORRECTIVE PROGRAM-
MING AND RECIDIVISM at 1 (2004).
94. See id. at iii.
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next in the status quo. As abuse victims told me again and again in my
days as a state prosecutor, they often had no idea about the history of bat-
tering and were completely unsuspecting when they decided to get
involved with their abusers. Some eventually communicated with former
wives, partners, or girlfriends of their batterers and shared the similarities
in their experiences of violence and abuse by the same batterer. However,
these conversations happened too late.
2. NIPPING LOVE IN THE BUD
What do I mean by too late? Consider the standard definition of domes-
tic violence: emotional, physical, and psychological abuse and violence
that takes place within the context of a physically intimate relationship. In
many instances, this physically intimate relationship is based on emotion-
al love or at least emotional affection. These relationships start off with-
out any abuse. This initial violence-free period can be thought of as an
incubation period9 5 or probationary period in the relationship.
What triggers the end of this period is often a change of circumstances.
The change typically represents several things: a source of stress to the
abuser, a symbolic loss of control for the abuser, and also a deepening
bond or commitment of the victim to the abuser.96 Classic examples of
such triggers include marriage and pregnancy. Both empirical studies and
anecdotal evidence show that many victims are first abused on their wed-
ding nights or during their honeymoon.97 There are numerous accounts of
victims being hit for the first time during a pregnancy. 98 Once married or
pregnant, victims often have deep emotional ties to the abuser. In addi-
tion, there are other concomitant bonds between them, including serious
financial dependencies, extended family relationships, and sometimes
reliance on one another for lawful immigration status. After marriage,
pregnancy, and the birth of children in common, it is no longer easy to
leave your abuser. A permanent end to the relationship will frequently
require formal legal actions, such as divorce or a child support and cus-
tody actions in family court.
The Scarlet Letter proposal intervenes before these triggering events,
before the formation of these complicated bonds, and before the difficult
95. I thank my research assistant, Michael Schordine, for coming up with this term.
96. See Weissman, supra note 19, at 417-22 (linking domestic violence to increased eco-
nomic stress within households due to recent unemployment and job loss).
97. See, e.g., Mackenzie Carpenter, Experts Say Wedding Days Aren't Always a Piece of
Cake, PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE, April 29, 2008, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/08120/
877410-54.stm.
98. See Rachelle Drouin, Domestic Violence in Pregnancy, http://www.womensweb.ca/vio-
lence/ dv/pregnancy.php (describing several studies including the statistic that one out of six
abused women report that their abuse began during pregnancy).
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exit options. Information will be available to the public at all times,
including during the incubation period in those very early moments of a
budding relationship, so that individuals can learn about the battering his-
tory of their potential romantic partners.99 If they were to learn of a trou-
bling past record, the individuals can then decide not to pursue the rela-
tionships any further. At these early moments, there are no deep ties to
stand in the way of relatively easy exits. Public access to order of protec-
tion databases then is a powerful preventive measure to reduce the inci-
dence of domestic violence.
3. THREE LEVELS OF PREVENTION
In this final section of part III, I want to detail some additional ways in
which the Scarlet Letter proposal will reduce domestic violence. I have
already described a potential victim's self-interest in avoiding intimate
abuse. Family and friends share the potential victim's interest in avoiding
such abuse. Because the system will be accessible to anyone in the pub-
lic, even friends and family of potential victims will be able to run search-
es of the databases. If they learn of a history of battering, then they too
will attempt to terminate these relationships in the interest of preventing
their loved ones from becoming future victims. This is a critical feature of
the proposal because unlike most reforms in domestic violence law, it
addresses the pervasive isolation of victims in domestic violence. Studies
have shown that this isolation is for many batterers a significant part of
their abusive control and power over their victims. By empowering
friends and family with awareness and information, the proposal breaks
down this dangerous isolation of victims.
Increased general deterrence is yet another way in which the proposal
will be able to reduce the incidence of domestic violence. Under the cur-
rent system, the issuance of an order of protection certainly disrupts the
relationship between the batterer and his instant victim and perhaps their
children in common; however, the batterer's relationships with others,
specifically potential future victims, are largely unaffected. Effectively
there is anonymity in our current criminal justice systems. Interestingly,
although the last thirty-five years have seen the "outing" of domestic vio-
lence from being a private family problem to now being a public social
crisis, there still is individual anonymity. We have shamed domestic vio-
lence generally, but we have done very little to shame individual batterers
specifically.
99. Again, I propose that the variables needed to conduct a search be minimal: only a full
name and date of birth. This is purposeful so as to enable even people who barely know one
another to utilize the database.
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This anonymity protects batterers from feeling the full sting of public
moral condemnation. The Scarlet Letter proposal eliminates this anonymi-
ty. Potential batterers who are contemplating abuse of their intimate part-
ners may now think twice because the public nature of the punishment
adds a stigma, namely the "Scarlet Letter," that is not there under the sta-
tus quo. The result is a more onerous penalty that will disrupt the life of a
batterer much more significantly. This incremental increase in the penalty,
under utilitarian theory, should deter more potential batterers from engag-
ing in domestic violence.
Finally, the proposal can also be designed to achieve additional specific
deterrence. In many states with open criminal record databases, there are
forgiveness provisions. These provisions enable the removal of old con-
victions from public databases. To qualify for this forgiveness, criminals
have to stay crime-free for a certain amount of time. The amount of time
can be set at whatever a state believes makes sense for domestic violence.
Examples of time periods from current forgiveness provisions range from
ten to fifteen years." The point is that forgiveness provisions enhance
specific deterrence because they motivate known batterers to avoid future
incidences of battering and to be "good" so that their names can be
removed from the database.
IV. The Costs and Concerns
Part IV addresses negative concerns raised by the proposal. They
divide into two broad categories: concerns for the victims of domestic vio-
lence and concerns for the perpetrators of domestic violence. Underlying
these concerns are serious social values and commitments, such as the due
process of law, the right to privacy, the need to forgive, and the desire to
rehabilitate. Some of the concerns are met by existing patterns and mech-
anisms in the current order-of-protection regime. Other worries are
addressed by analogizing to other types of public databases. Still other
issues suggest the possibility of additional modifications to improve the
proposal. Ultimately, I conclude that the benefits of the proposal outweigh
these costs or concerns.
A. Fewer Victims Will Seek Orders of Protection
Often when there is an aggressive change being proposed for the legal
toolbox against domestic violence, there is the prediction that victims will
100. See Commonwealth of Massachusetts, District Court Department of the Trial Court,
A Guide to Public Access, Sealing and Expungement of District Court Records 39-52 (April
2010), http://www.mass.gov/courts/courtsandjudges/courts/districtcourt/pubaccesscourt
records.pdf.
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react by rejecting the change as being too aggressive. This rejection will
be expressed as a disengagement from the system. For example, when
mandatory arrest was first circulated as a proposal for law enforcement
agencies, opponents doubted its potential to reduce violence because they
believed that many victims do not desire the arrest of their batterers and,
thus, would react to a mandatory arrest policy by simply not calling 911
or their local police departments for help."' This prediction was particu-
larly frightening because for most victims, calling 911 is often the only
means through which they are able to halt the assaults and to secure med-
ical attention for their injuries. Similar concerns were articulated when
mandatory prosecution policies were proposed and when domestic vio-
lence crimes were elevated to felony categories punishable by significant
imprisonment. 102
Likewise, the Scarlet Letter proposal is vulnerable to the same line of
criticism. Again, many domestic violence victims may not desire the pub-
lic outing of their batterers and their situations. Knowing that final orders
of protection will mean the entry of their batterers' names into a public
database, these victims may not seek orders of protection in the first place.
This outcome would be a serious setback to the gains achieved by the
order-of-protection regime in this country. The universal concern here is
that policies and laws cannot be too aggressive and must be flexible
enough to accommodate the varying wishes of domestic violence vic-
tims.103 Rejection by victims leads to disengagement from the legal sys-
tem and disengagement dangerously leads to further isolation of domestic
violence victims.
Rejection by victims is a particularly difficult problem in the domestic
violence context because of the inherently private nature of the abuse.
Unlike robberies or burglaries, domestic violence takes place behind
closed doors and between intimate parties. Thus, the legal system only
becomes aware of the violence when it spills over into public spaces or
when one of the intimate parties, usually the victim, chooses to reveal the
violence and to engage the public legal system. The legal system, there-
fore, is beholden to the cooperation of victims for any success in reducing
the incidence of domestic violence. Any proposal to escalate the legal tac-
tics has to work with victims and not alienate them.
My response to this perennial concern is based on an empirical under-
standing of the behavior of victims. Studies show that under the current
system, many victims do not seek orders of protection at the first instance
101. See Prentice L. White, Stopping the Chronic Batterer Through Legislation: Will It Work
This Time?, 31 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 709, 755-56 (2004).
102. See id. at 757-58.
103. See Alisa Smith, Domestic Violence Laws: The Voices of Battered Women, 16
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of violence.'1 Instead, they seek orders of protection at a much later point
in time when many other less aggressive strategies have failed.'os This
may be after several or even many episodes of physical, emotional, and
sexual abuse, stalking, threats, etc.
Although the Scarlet Letter proposal certainly adds new public stigma
to the issuance of final orders of protection, I believe that it does little to
alter the calculus of a victim who is in the midst of experiencing domes-
tic violence and is deciding whether to seek such orders or not. A victim
who has already tried numerous, less aggressive strategies, such as coun-
seling, temporary voluntary physical separation, and discussions with
family and friends and who is now on the brink of petitioning for a
restraining order, is already contemplating the escalation of her situation
beyond simply the public stigma. She is ready to engage in a legal inter-
vention involving a court and a judge and perhaps even attorneys. She is
ready to submit sworn written and oral testimony about the violence and
abuse she has suffered. She is ready to invite the public into her private
sphere. Upon the issuance of a warrant and a temporary order, her batter-
er is already subject to the burden of court appearances, forced physical
separation, limited contact with their children in common, of possibly hir-
ing a lawyer, of mounting a defense in a court of law, and, perhaps most
importantly, of potential jail time should he violate the order.
The additional public stigma of an accessible database strives to change
the calculus significantly for future victims of domestic violence, but it
has limited impact for current victims. The limited impact that avoids the
doomsday predictions of those who worry that victims will not seek
orders of protection. Indeed, although similar predictions were made in
response to the adoption of mandatory arrest and prosecution policies,
there are still many family disturbance calls made to 911. This doomsday
prediction is either not as dire as described or not true.
B. Victims Will Be Blamed for Post-Registry Violence
A second concern about the welfare of victims is that the Scarlet Letter
proposal will lead to greater blame being placed on victims. It is true that
the proposal's commitment to victim autonomy means that the released
information will not necessarily persuade all individuals to end their rela-
tionships with known batterers; some will choose to take the risk and to
pursue these relationships. They may believe that the past should be kept
VIOLENCE AND VICns 91-92 (2001).
104. See Judy L. Postmus, Challenging the Negative Assumptions About Civil Protection
Orders: A Guide for Advocates, 22 J. OF WOMEN AND SOCIAL WORK 347, 349 (2007).
105. See id.
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in the past; that the batterer has changed and that past violence was not his
fault, but rather the fault of past victims; that they will be able to change
the bad behavior of the batterer, that domestic violence would never hap-
pen to them, etc. There are numerous rationalizations and excuses that
may counter the warning provided by the order-of-protection databases.
However, empirical data about serial battering strongly indicates that a
number of these risk-takers are sure to be victims themselves of the same
batterers. 06 The concern then is that these "risk-takers turned victims"
will be blamed for their own abuse since they did not heed the warnings
provided by the database. Arguably the proposal threatens to take societal
attitudes back to the blame game that existed prior to the reforms of the
movement against domestic violence.
This second concern is troubling because we certainly do not want to
return to the past bad attitudes surrounding victims of domestic violence;
however, I have two problems with this concern. First, I do not think this
is a concern uniquely raised by my proposal. The status quo still has rem-
nants of the "blame the victim" attitude. For example, some observers
have speculated that this attitude may have been consciously or uncon-
sciously present in the law enforcement officers who mishandled the
Jessica Gonzalez tragedy described above. Believing that Jessica
Gonzalez was at least partly responsible for the situation with her ex-hus-
band may have reduced the will of these officers to help her and led them
to ignore her pleas. Blame is still around, and this proposal is not respon-
sible for bringing it back. It may create another outlet to articulate the
blame attitude, but it does not create the attitude in the first place.
The additional problem with this concern about blaming victims is that
it exaggerates the consequences of the "blame the victim" attitude.
Notwithstanding the Castle Rock and Jessica Gonzalez tragedy, progress
has been made by the domestic violence movement to eliminate the
"blame the victim" attitude and to reduce its implications for victims. For
instance, mandatory policies are universally applied whether the victims
are to blame or not for the abusive incident. In a mandatory arrest juris-
diction, police officers are to arrest perpetrators of domestic violence even
if the victims arguably should not have stayed with their batterers where
the violence has been long-term and ongoing. The same is true for manda-
tory prosecution policies. The central point of these mandates is to reduce
the discretion of key players, such as police officers and prosecutors,
because individual discretion may be undesirably influenced by things
like the "blame the victim" attitude. The Scarlet Letter proposal does not
reverse these mandates and other similar achievements of the domestic
violence movement to counter the blame problem.
106. See ADAMS, supra note 90.
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C. The Innocent Will Be Stigmatized
In addition to the interests of victims, there are the interests of batter-
ers to consider in evaluating the Scarlet Letter proposal. These next two
items identify specific ways in which the proposal may unduly harm bat-
terers. The first possible harm is the branding of innocent individuals as
batterers and the second is the invasion of privacy.
Since the late 1990s, the domestic violence movement has witnessed a
significant backlash from various interest groups. One particular area of
concern has been the ease with which judges issue orders of protection.
As one of the pioneering states in building an extensive legal infrastruc-
ture for restraining orders, Massachusetts saw an outpouring of petitions
for orders of protection, followed by a relaxation of procedure. The
Boston Globe reported in 1998 that "[g]etting an order was supposed to
require a hearing, but with crowded courts, restraining orders have for the
most part been routinely granted if a judge gets an affidavit from a woman
saying she is in fear."' 07 Even Massachusetts' judges agree that they may
be granting orders of protection too easily, but they say with overbur-
dened court systems, "it is hard to find time to decide who to believe,
much less hold a full hearing."' One judge, in particular, describes the
dilemma of orders of protection:
It's an awful problem, because while there's more domestic violence than we
like to think there is, our sense is that the (restraining orders] are not infre-
quently abused . . . This law is having the side effects that aren't intended. On
the other hand, we're at risk of terrible things happening. Nobody wants to be
the one who denies one of these orders when something terrible happens. 109
The seeming ease with which orders of protection are issued has been
exacerbated by divorce gamesmanship. Prior to the use of orders of pro-
tection in domestic violence settings, individuals who wanted their spous-
es out of the house would have to file for divorce first and then file a
motion to vacate the home.1 o This was a costly and lengthy process."'
Today very few individuals file motions to vacate in Massachusetts." 2
Instead, divorce attorneys in that state describe restraining orders as a
far more expedient means to get spouses out of marital homes and thus, a
new popular weapon to gain the upper hand in bitter divorces and custody
disputes.'13
107. See Kate Zemike, Divorced Dads Emerge as a Political Force, BOSTON GLOBE, May
19, 1998 at Al.
108. See id.
109. See id. (quoting Middlesex Probate Judge Beverly Boorstein from Massachusetts).
110. See id.
Ill. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id.
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The result of all these contributing factors (the crowded court systems,
the "better safe than sorry" caution of judges, and the divorce gamesman-
ship) is that innocent individuals who did not commit an act of abuse are
nevertheless subject to orders of protection.1 4 It is probably impossible to
know exactly what percentage of the total number of orders of protection
is meritless, but at a minimum, the anecdotal evidence reveals that there
are enough instances to be concerned. The particular consideration then
for the Scarlet Letter proposal is that it aggravates this situation by now
publicly mislabeling certain innocent individuals as batterers.
Recognizing this problem, the proposal specifies that the publicly
accessible databases contain only the identities of batterers against whom
final orders of protection have been issued. The databases will not contain
the names of batterers against whom only temporary restraining orders are
placed. Temporary orders last from one court date to the next court date
and are in place during the pendency of cases. Rarely do they last for more
than one to two months at a time. On the other hand, judges issue final
orders at the conclusion of cases, and they can last for as long as five
years. The length of time varies with the type of court that is issuing the
order, the specific substantive resolution of the cases, the state jurisdic-
tion, etc. For example, in the criminal setting, a final order is part of the
final sentence for a criminal conviction. This conviction can be for a
felony or a misdemeanor and in some states, even for a violation.
Including the identities of only those batterers subject to final orders of
protection is a design specification premised upon the greater procedural
steps in place for final restraining orders. To use the criminal example
again, a felony or misdemeanor conviction is an expression of societal con-
demnation and frequently subject to incarceration. Thus, there are many
procedural protections provided by statute and under state and federal con-
stitutions to ensure the integrity of these convictions. It is therefore much
more difficult to get a final order of protection than a temporary one in
criminal court. Similar heightened processes further provide for the integri-
ty of final civil restraining orders too." 5 By limiting its information only to
final orders of protection, the databases in the Scarlet Letter proposal min-
imize the risk of wrongly stigmatizing innocent individuals.
D. The Threat to Privacy
Another concern about the welfare of batterers is an oft-repeated con-
cern about the incredible access to information made possible through the
114. Fathers' rights groups have rallied around such experiences and have grown in numbers
and in political strength. See id.
115. In the civil setting, final orders are issued only after judges have been satisfied that there
was a past incident of domestic violence and that there is a continuing threat to the petitioner.
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global Internet revolution: the threat to privacy.' 16 Privacy is a ubiquitous
and powerful concept in the law that often eludes satisfactory defini-
tion." 7 Long before computers and the Internet, Samuel Warren and
Louis Brandeis wrote their famous law review article, The Right to
Privacy, in 1890.' "8 Building on their articulation of dignitary harm,
William Prosser in 1960 made the first notable attempt to organize the
notion of privacy into four causes of action in tort law." 9 While these
early works are an important foundation in the legal development of the
concept of privacy, they have become outdated due to proliferation of law
concerning privacy 20 and the rapidly changing technologies of the infor-
mation age. Today, contemporary scholars, such as Anita Allen,121 Jerry
Kang,122 and Dan Solove, provide new insights into privacy that are help-
ful, meaningful frameworks for assessing the threat to privacy posed by
my proposal.
The particular conception of privacy that is the most relevant here is
informational privacy as opposed to decisional privacy.' 23 In his article, A
Taxonomy of Privacy, Dan Solove develops a new scheme for privacy by
dividing into four groups the different types of activities that invade an
individual's privacy.' 24 Three of the four groups focus exclusively on
informational privacy (information collection, information processing,
and information dissemination).125 Within the categories of information
116. See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for
Information Privacy, 53 STAN L. REV. 1393, 1456 (2001).
117. "Privacy is a chameleon-like word, used denotatively to designate a range of wildly dis-
parate interests-from confidentiality of personal information to reproductive autonomy-and
connotatively to generate goodwill on behalf of whatever interest is being asserted in its name."
See Caren Myers Morrison, Privacy, Accountability, and the Cooperating Defendant: Towards
A New Role for Internet Access to Court Records, 62 VANDERBILT L. REV. 921 (2009) (quoting
Lillian R. BeVier, Information About Individuals in the Hands of Government: Some
Reflections on Mechanisms for Privacy Protection, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 455, 458
(1995)).
118. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193
(1890) (reacting in part to the development of photography and the small, portable camera).
119. These four torts are intrusions upon seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, false
light, and appropriation. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
120. See Anita L. Allen, Privacy in American Law in PRIVACIES: PHILOSOPHICAL
EVALUATIONS 19, 26 (Beate R6ssler ed., 2004).
121. See id.; see also Anita L. Allen, Dredging Up the Past: Lifelogging, Memory, and
Surveillance, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 47 (2008).
122. See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1193 (1998).
123. Informational privacy is the right to be free from unwanted disclosure of personal data
while decisional privacy concerns the right to be free from government interference in making
important personal choices. See Morrison, Privacy Accountability, supra note 117, at section
IIBl.
124. Dan Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PENN. L. REV. 477, 483-91 (2006).
125. The fourth group bridges informational privacy to decisional privacy (invasions). See
id. at 488-91.
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processing and information dissemination, Professor Solove articulates
three specific activities that are at issue in my proposal. The first is the
aggregation of information where the state gathers together information
about a person;126 the second is the disclosure of information whereby the
state reveals truthful information about a person that will impact the way
others judge her;' 2 7 and the third is the increased accessibility of infor-
mation where the state makes such disclosures to more people.12 8
Since its early recognition of privacy as decisional privacy in cases
such as Griswold v. Connecticut 29 and Roe v. Wade,130 the Supreme Court
has gone on to wrestle with the boundaries of legal protection for infor-
mational privacy in several cases relating to criminal justice information.
This has been a gradual process in which the Court at first distinguished
informational privacy from decisional privacy and refused to provide con-
stitutional protection. Later, the Court recognized statutory protection
for the distinct and varied ways in which the state can harm information-
al privacy.
In 1976, in the case of Paul v. Davis,"3 ' the plaintiff sued his local
police departments for displaying his name and photograph on a list of
active shoplifters and for distributing that list to neighborhood mer-
chants.'32 The plaintiff had indeed been arrested and thus was not disput-
ing the accuracy of his inclusion on a list of shoplifting arrestees.' 33 In the
language of Professor Solove's schema, the plaintiff protested the disclo-
sure of this truthful information about himself to others because it would
likely impact negatively the way that others judge him.
Following the footsteps of Roe and other related cases, the plaintiff
charged that his right to privacy had been infringed by such disclosure.
Justice Rehnquist held that "none of our substantive privacy decisions
hold" "that the State may not publicize a record of an official act such as
an arrest."1 34 This was a simple refusal to extend the protection of deci-
sional privacy to informational privacy without any further elaboration.
However, Justice Rehnquist's emphatic description of the arrest as an
126. Id. at 505-09.
127. Id. at 527-32.
128. Id. at 536-38.
129. See 381 U.S. 479,484 (1965) (concerning the use of contraceptives by married couples).
130. See 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (protecting the pregnant woman's decision to have an
abortion).
131. 424 U.N.S. 693 (1976).
132. See id. at 695-96.
133. The exact language describing the individuals was: "These persons have been arrested
during 1971 and 1972 or have been active in various criminal fields in high density shopping
areas." See id. After the list had already been circulated, the shoplifting charge against the plain-
tiff was dismissed. See id.
134. See id. at 714.
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official act of the state suggests that there is a distinction between the dis-
closure of public information and the disclosure of personal information.
If an arrest is a public act of a public actor, then there should be no prob-
lem in making the fact of the arrest public, too. I discussed this approach
to disclosure in the context of the proposal to broaden access to order-of-
protection registries earlier.' 35 Finally, it bears emphasis that none of the
dissenting justices in Paul v. Davis believed that the state was constitu-
tionally barred from publicizing the fact of an arrest.
As for the plaintiffs due process claims about the injury to his reputa-
tion, Justice Rehnquist held that mere injury to reputation is not enough to
trigger the protection of the due process clause. It is only when an alter-
ation of legal status accompanies the injury to reputation that procedural
and substantive due process safeguards are triggered.136 This part of the
decision received a lot of attention from the dissenting justices who
believed that reputation alone, without any change in legal status, should
be a protected liberty interest under the due process clause. However, the
Supreme Court recently relied on the majority's more restrictive view of
reputational harm and due process in Paul v. Davis when it upheld
Connecticut's procedures in its Megan's Law registry for convicted sex
offenders.' 37
Thirteen years later in 1989, the Supreme Court progressed beyond
decisional privacy and broadened the legal protection of informational
privacy in United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee
for Freedom of the Press.'38 Here the issue is whether an application
under the Freedom of Information Act [hereinafter FOIA] for the rap
sheet on a particular person violates the protection of personal privacy
provided by that statute. This case is remarkable for several reasons. First,
the Court recognized a difference between scattered pieces of information
in local courthouses and precincts and a fully assembled, compiled
dossier.' Even though the dossier included bits of information that are
otherwise publicly available, the Court found that there still was an
infringement of privacy within the privacy protections of FOIA.'" Noting
the limited access to FBI-generated rap sheets, the Court held that the
"careful and limited pattern of authorized rap-sheet disclosure fits the dic-
tionary definition of privacy ... [and] evidence[s] a congressional intent
to protect the privacy of rap-sheet subjects, and a concomitant recognition
135. See infra text accompanying notes 69-75.
136. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 708.
137. See Ct. Dep't of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 6-7 (2003).
138. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
139. See id at 764-65.
140. See id.
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of the power of compilations to affect personal privacy that outstrips the
combined power of the bits of information contained within."l 4 ' The
Court hereby acknowledged the particular harms that can arise when the
state engages in the activity described by Professor Solove as the aggre-
gation of information. 142
Another remarkable point in the Reporters Committee opinion is the
Court's recognition of the separate harm due to increased accessibility.
The compiled rap sheet kept by the FBI is more easily accessible than the
individual conviction records and arrest logs maintained by different law
enforcement agencies at the local and state level. "Plainly there is a vast
difference between the public records that might be found after a diligent
search of courthouse files, county archives, and local police stations
throughout the country and a computerized summary located in a single
clearinghouse of information."'143 The Supreme Court found that this dif-
ference also placed the interests of the rap-sheet subject squarely within
the privacy protection of FOIA.
Clearly today the Supreme Court is mindful of the harms to informa-
tional privacy. However, it is important to note that the legal context of
the Reporters Committee decision was the Freedom of Information Act
and that the holding was based entirely on this federal statute and thus, did
not extend to constitutional law. I am certain that there will be cases in the
future to test the Supreme Court's willingness to increase the constitu-
tional protections for informational privacy;" for now, though, I offer a
preliminary analysis of whether my proposal about order of protection
databases unduly infringes upon the privacy rights of batterers.
It is ironic that one of the chief concerns of the proposal is about pri-
vacy. Arguably this concern is similar to the original premise that the state
and society should not intervene in matters of domestic violence because
such violence is a private family affair. Better known as the doctrine of
nonintervention, this premise kept intact families out of the reach of the
law. It was powerful in the context of domestic abuse because it operated
in conjunction with a longstanding belief that husbands had the right to
limited corporal discipline of their wives. Family privacy, nonintervention
and chauvinistic entitlement effectively isolated domestic abuse from law
enforcement for centuries. It was not until the national feminist movement
of the 1960s and 1970s that an alternative vision of domestic violence as
a public crisis and as a crime took hold.
141. See id. at 765.
142. See Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 116, at 508-09.
143. See Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 763-64.
144. See Whalen v. Rose, 429 U.S. 589, 607 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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Again, the proposal involves the disclosure and increased accessibility
of information and perhaps even additional aggregation of information.
States currently maintain databases of the orders of protection that they
issue on behalf of domestic violence victims. The proposal calls for allow-
ing public access to the identities of batterers to whom such orders are
issued where there is no such access and also for broadly publicizing the
accessibility to such information where there is already such access. This
is clearly about the disclosure and increased accessibility of information.
To be a workable database, further aggregation of the information also
may be necessary. For instance, it may be helpful to pool the databases of
all the states so that users can access all of them at once, as opposed to
running fifty separate searches.
Will there be harm done to the reputations of these batterers? Of
course. The very success of the proposal depends on it. After all, the goal
of the proposal is not simply to spread more information for information's
sake, but rather it envisions those who access the information using the
information to make better decisions about their intimate relationships.
Better decision-making would steer potential victims away from being
involved with known batterers. This would indeed be harmful from the
perspective of the batterers.
Should the law protect batterers from such harm? Do batterers have a
right to insist on their informational privacy in this context? As Professor
Solove explains, acknowledging that batterers will suffer harm does not
necessarily mean that the law should eliminate, minimize, prevent, or pro-
vide redress for such harm. 145 There are several important countervailing
interests that outweigh this concern for the privacy of batterers. The first is
the public nature of final orders of protection and the right of the public to
know about their public institutions and public actors. The second is the
need to safeguard future victims of domestic violence, and the third is the
attenuated privacy rights of batterers. Arguably, they deserve a more lim-
ited or lesser right to conceal their harmful activities from the public eye.
Final orders of protection are issued by judges in both criminal and
civil settings. The civil and criminal judges are state actors, their issuance
of protective orders are public acts, such orders are made in public court-
rooms, and the context of the orders are publicly filed and indexed litiga-
tion matters. The enforcement of such orders are local police who serve
the protective orders, respond to emergency calls concerning the orders,
and, if necessary, arrest those who violate such orders. Prosecutors on the
145. "Of course, declaring that an activity is harmful or problematic does not automatically
imply that there should be legal redress, since there may be valid reasons why the law should
not get involved or why countervailing interests should prevail." See Solove, A Taxonomy of
Privacy, supra note 116, at 484.
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local, state, and federal levels charge batterers with such crimes as con-
tempt and violations of orders of protection. Because the order-of-protec-
tion regime is a creature of the state, the public has the right to know about
it. This is precisely the type of information that needs to be disclosed.
Transparency about the inner workings of our public institutions and
actors is necessary for a robust exercise of the First Amendment and for
effective monitoring by citizenry of their government.14 6
Perhaps the most powerful argument about the public nature of orders
of protection is the fact that there is already public access to such infor-
mation in paper records maintained by courthouses and local law enforce-
ment agencies. Although commentators are probably correct when they
describe paper access to rap-sheets as quite limited and enabling of "prac-
tical obscurity," the paper access exists not because it is rarely used, but
rather because access is a testament to the public nature of the information
being disclosed and the importance of such disclosure. If certain informa-
tion is already available to the public, albeit in non-digital form, then the
privacy interests of the individual are either moot or outweighed by these
more societal interests.
Electronic access to what is otherwise already out in the public mar-
ketplace of ideas should not otherwise create privacy rights. To block
electronic access while allowing paper access mocks the idea of public
access and undermines our commitment to the First Amendment and to
the effective monitoring of government. This "public is public" approach
to the issue of electronic dissemination may be simple and intuitive,'47 but
in this particular context of orders of protection, it is also appropriate
because of the harmful acts of batterers.
The information contained in order-of-protection registries is not only
public, it also offers a prediction of harm. It is powerful evidence that a
prospective or current intimate partner is likely to engage in domestic
abuse and violence again. Given the strong tendencies toward serial or
repeat battering exhibited by many abusers, this information could be
used to avoid many future incidents of physical, psychological, and emo-
tional damage. Thus, outweighing the privacy needs of batterers is the
obligation of the state to prevent others from becoming the future victims
of serial and repeat batterers.
The third reason the law should not protect the informational privacy
of batterers is the attenuated nature of their claim to privacy. They are in
146. This enabling of monitoring by citizenry is the primary goal of the Freedom of
Information Act. See Anthony T. Kronman, The Privacy Exemption to the Freedom of
Information Act, 4 J. OF LEGAL STUDIEs 727, 733-34 (1980).
147. See Morrison, Privacy Accountability, supra note 117, at 41 (describing the "public is
public" approach an enviably simple and intuitive).
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such registries because of a judicial finding that they have engaged in
some past domestic violence and because of the continuing threat they
pose to a past victim. If the law were to protect the right of batterers to
remain anonymous, then the law would be concealing from the public the
fact of past abuse and the likelihood of future abuse. Abusers would be
able to present themselves to others as if they had a "clean" or "good" rep-
utation. This would be a dangerous deception. As Professor BeVier
explains, "[t]he ability to conceal discreditable facts about oneself permits
one to acquire that benefit without having to pay the full behavioral
price."148 The full behavioral price should include injury to reputation and
a loss of privacy; those who receive a final order of protection should be
paying the full price.
Some scholars and jurists have been more forgiving toward bad actors.
Instead of seeing a forfeiture of privacy rights and the need to protect
innocent victims from future harm, they articulate a community where
individuals should be allowed to remake themselves and not have their
past acts follow them for all eternity. Perhaps that is because they are not
specifically addressing the population of batterers or addressing a differ-
ent population altogether. Professor Caren Morrison makes such an argu-
ment for government cooperators. She worries that electronic access with
its limitless dissemination and permanent accessibility inflicts particular
injuries on informational privacy and prevents beneficial forgetting. 14 9
The Supreme Court made similar arguments in recognizing the privacy
exemptions of FOIA in denying the request for the FBI-generated rap
sheet for a particular individual.'
This argument is a good one that deserves more consideration than sim-
ply the fact that batterers are harmful actors who do not have the right to
conceal their harmful behavior under the cover of privacy. There should
be a space for forgiveness and rehabilitation, which are important parts of
a criminal justice system, independent of the right to privacy. Therefore,
I will explore this concern about the need to forgive and forget more fully
in the next part.
E. A Permanent "Loveless" Underclass and the
Need to Forgive and Forget
The final objection to the proposal is based on the welfare of individ-
ual batterers, but also on a vision of social welfare. If the identities of indi-
viduals who have committed past acts of violence are made known to the
148. See BeVier, Information About Individuals, supra note 117, at 470.
149. See Morrison, Privacy Accountability, supra note 117, at 44-45.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 138-44.
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public and the response of others is to avoid any intimacy with them, then
the outcome is the creation of a "loveless" underclass. The proposal con-
templates that the population of known batterers will find it much more
difficult, and perhaps even impossible, to have intimate relationships. I
readily admit that the success of the Scarlet Letter proposal in reducing the
incidence of domestic violence depends on some variation of this outcome.
The objection then is the undesirability of a permanent "loveless" under-
class, from the perspectives of the individual batterers and also society.
While the protest from individual batterers is easily understood, the
argument about social welfare is a little less obvious. The central thesis is
that it is not in the interest of society to shun permanently a group of peo-
ple from the general population in matters as critical and necessary as
human intimacy. It is overly alarmist to extend this central thesis to pre-
dict increased incidence of rape or predatory sexual abuse of children;
however, there are serious moral, religious, and public policy reasons to
heed the warning about a permanent "loveless" underclass. Forgiveness
and opportunities for redemption are aspects of the human condition that
are arguably necessary for any healthy, successful community. There are
two responses to this social welfare argument.
First, as described above in part II(C)(3), the Scarlet Letter proposal
features its own forgiveness provisions. The proposal contemplates that
any individual featured in the public database can have his name removed,
but only after avoiding any bad behavior for a designated period of time.
Every jurisdiction can decide its exact terms. For instance, New York
State may choose to remove the names of known batterers only if they
have avoided any acts of violence, whether domestic or otherwise, for a
period of five years. Connecticut may choose to forgive batterers if they
have refrained from any domestic violence for a period of ten years.1'
Still other states may decide to forgive only if there have been no subse-
quent criminal convictions of any kind.
Again, this type of provision is modeled after the forgiveness provi-
sions that currently exist in the criminal history databases of some states.
The provisions create a specific incentive for good behavior in individual
batterers and they preserve the forgiveness and redemption aspects of
humanity. The type of forgiveness secured by these provisions is superi-
or to the status quo where the de facto anonymity of the criminal justice
15 1. One weakness of the hypothetical Connecticut version is that avoidance of additional
domestic violence may not be difficult if others who are accessing the public database deliber-
ately avoid any intimacy with the known batterers. Without new intimate relationships, known
batterers may have very limited to no opportunities to engage in domestic violence. Hence, the
hypothetical New York version may be better in that it insists that known batterers rise to a more
genuine challenge of no violence in their lives at all.
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and family court systems constitute automatic, blanket forgiveness for
all batterers. Under this proposal, individual batterers have to earn their
forgiveness. Those who manage to behave go back into the general pop-
ulation and are able to have intimate relationships free of any stigma;
those who do not behave remain appropriately stigmatized and shunned.
Second, there are countervailing interests that justify the long-term
shunning of a subpopulation. For example, we in the United States have
long made public individuals' credit histories so that vendors can share
information and be protected from the unpaid obligations of debtors.
Likewise, under the Scarlet Letter proposal, there are the interests of
future victims of domestic violence to balance against these concerns
about the welfare of batterers. Future victims have the right and the need
to know the same information that their governments know about the vio-
lent tendencies of potential romantic partners. Domestic violence takes an
enormous toil upon individuals, families, children, and greater society and
is in many ways more important than bad debt. Empowering citizen mem-
bers of our communities to avoid it in their own lives is worth the rela-
tively lesser problem of a permanent underclass.
V. Conclusion
The impact of this proposal will be significant on several different lev-
els. First, the number of individuals whose identities would be included in
the database will be quite high. As mentioned above in the New York
State example, as of 2006, the total number of orders of protection in the
New York State Registry was 1,411,264. This number includes both tem-
porary and final orders of protection and does not distinguish between
them; thus, it is hard to know exactly how many final orders of protection
there would be in the publicly accessible database. However, with a total
of over a million restraining orders, it is certain that the publicly accessi-
ble database will have hundreds of thousands of names.
Secondly, the Scarlet Letter proposal will change the direction of the
domestic violence movement. Instead of being reactive to past acts of vio-
lence, the proposal is preemptive and strives to avoid violence and abuse
in the first place. This alone could be a huge reduction in the amount of
physical, emotional, and sexual harm suffered by victims of domestic vio-
lence. Instead of forcing victims to live with undesirable consequences,
such as the potential imprisonment of their batterers, the proposal leaves
victims in control. Respect for the autonomy of victims is a feature of lib-
ertarian paternalism and critical to acceptance of the proposal by potential
victims. In addition, the proposal bridges the gap between those in the
domestic violence movement who continue to support the legal approach
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and those who want to dismantle that approach. The proposal builds upon
the existing legal structures of the restraining order regime, but does so in
a way that does not add to legal penalties or mandates. Instead, publicly
accessible databases operate in that space between public law and private
action. This space is typically very difficult to negotiate, but this propos-
al ambitiously tries.
The final momentum of the proposal lies in its goal to shift the way that
society and individual victims think about how to combat domestic vio-
lence. Many of the earlier reforms of the domestic violence movement
have increased and enhanced the options that individual victims have to
try and end the violence in their lives. However, these reforms largely
asked the victims to take action themselves to take advantage of their
benefits. The state and other individuals, such as prosecutors and social
workers and counselors would be there to help but only after violence and
abuse have already occurred and only after deep bonds have already
formed between the victims and their batterers. The heart of the Scarlet
Letter proposal is the collective sharing of information among past,
present, and future victims of domestic violence and, in a sense, relies on
the ethos of women helping each other. Critically then, the proposal asks
the state to join this community effort and facilitate the distribution of
information by opening up its existing databases.
I want to close this initial discussion of the Scarlet Letter proposal with
one last provocative thought. Not only is the Scarlet Letter proposal a good
idea, but because the state knows of the strong likelihood of serial batter-
ing and knows the identities of past batterers, the state has an obligation
to share that information with its citizens. Keeping such information from
citizens is ultimately dangerous and unjustified. The state exists to protect
the health and safety of its citizens and, many of its female citizens still
suffer from the wrath of domestic violence. It is time for the state to face
its obligations and to empower its citizens to protect themselves.
